W. V. Quine was quite simply the most distinguished analytic philosopher of the later half of the twentieth century. His celebrated attack on the analytic/synthetic tradition heralded a major shift away from the views of language descended from logical positivism. His most important book, Word and Object, introduced the concept of indeterminacy of radical translation, a bleak view of the nature of the language with which we ascribe thoughts and beliefs to ourselves and others. Quine is also famous for the (...) view that epistemology should be naturalized, that is conducted in a scientific spirit with the object of investigating the relationship between the inputs of experience and the outputs of belief. The eleven essays in this volume cover all the central topics of Quine's philosophy: the underdetermination of physical theory, analycity, naturalism, propositional attitudes, behaviorism, reference and ontology, positivism, holism and logic. (shrink)

Quine has long maintained in connection with his theses of under-determination of physical theory and indeterminacy of translation that there is a fact of the matter to physics but no fact of the matter to translation. In this paper, I investigate Quine's reasoning for this claim. I show that Quine's thinking about under-determination over the last twenty-five years has landed him in a contradiction: he says of two global physical theories that are empirically equivalent but logically incompatible that only one (...) is trueand that they are both true. In accord with the former position, I explain Quine'ssemantical argument for the claim that there is a fact of the matter to physics but not to translation. However, Quine has apparently come to regard this position as inconsistent with his empiricistic scruples: if both theories imply all and only true observation categoricals, then in what sense could one of them be false? Quine'strivial expedient argument construes such pairs of theories as merely two true descriptions of the same world in different terms. In accord with this latter position, I suggest that Quine is left without a way to differentiate under-determination and indeterminacy. In short, Quine's contradiction poses a serious dilemma: either only one such theory is true and his empiricism is sacrificed, or both theories are true and his distinction between under-determination and indeterminacy is sacrificed. (shrink)

I juxtapose Quine's and Davidson's approaches to naturalized epistemology and assess Davidson's reasons for rejecting Quine's account of the nature of knowledge. Davidson argues that Quine's account of the nature of knowledge is Cartesian in spirit and consequence, i.e. it is essentially first person and invites global skepticism. I survey Quine's response to Davidson's criticisms and suggest that the view that Davidson criticizes may not be Quine's after all. I conclude by raising some questions about Quine's definition of ?observation sentence?

SummaryQuine's doctrine of underdetermination of physical theory presents him with a dilemma: Should he say of two global theory formulations that are empirically equivalent, logically compatible, equally simple, but which cannot be rendered logically equivalent by any known reconstrual of predicates, that they are both true or that only one of them is true ? If the former, then Quine's commitment to naturalism is at risk; if the latter, then his commitment to empiricism is at risk. When confronted with the (...) dilemma Quine initially opted for the sectarian view. A.C. Genova finds Quine's sectarian resolution of the dilemma unsatisfactory. He advocates, instead, an ecumenical resolution of the dilemma which, he maintains, is compatible with Quine's most prominent views. I disagree; I argue that Genova's way out involves a relativistic notion of true that is incompatible with Quine's absolutist view of truth. I then present Quine's latest thoughts on the dilemma of underdetermination. (shrink)

I argue that thompson's analysis of the argument proscribing abortion except to save the woman's life is inconsistent, For it commits thompson to the following set of statements: (1) all fetuses have a right not to be killed unjustly; (2) no fetus can be aborted/killed unjustly unless it possesses a right to a woman's body; (3) some fetuses do not possess a right to a woman's body. I suggest two alternative ways to deal with this inconsistency.

In chapter 2 of The Fragmentation of Reason, Stephen Stich argues that certain passages of Quine’s Word and Object are the source of what he calls the conceptual argument. That argument claims there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and rationality: intentionality requires rationality. Stich rejects the idea that intentionality requires either perfect or fixed bridgehead rationality, but he concedes that it requires minimal rationality. After explaining Stich’s position and a criticism of it offered by John Biro and Kirk Ludwig, (...) I sketch an alternative to the conceptual argument. This alternative claims that rationality requires psychological plausibility and/or smoothness of communication, not rationality. (shrink)

Quine's conception of philosophy, his doctrine of naturalism, is analyzed as springing from a negative side, the rejection of first philosophy, through holism and unregenerate realism, and leading to an affirmative side, the acceptance of science as the ultimate instance. Quine's position is compared with Lauener's pragmatic or open transcendentalism, which is conventionalist and explicitiy nonnaturalistic but in spite of a whole string of differences nevertheless similar to the former. Finally a naturalistic position gains preference because it has more explanatory (...) power and a purely conventionalist account of logic (and mathematics) seems quite unrealistic. (shrink)

Quine's conception of philosophy, his doctrine of naturalism, is analyzed as springing from a negative side, the rejection of first philosophy, through holism and unregenerate realism, and leading to an affirmative side, the acceptance of science as the ultimate instance. Quine's position is compared with Lauener's pragmatic or open transcendentalism, which is conventionalist and explicitiy nonnaturalistic but in spite of a whole string of differences nevertheless similar to the former. Finally a naturalistic position gains preference because it has more explanatory (...) power and a purely conventionalist account of logic (and mathematics) seems quite unrealistic. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and Pragmatism.

Lipton articulates and defends a partial description of a central mechanism of inductive inference: Inference to the Best Explanation. IBE "is widely supposed to provide an accurate description of a central mechanism governing our [inductive] inferential practices and also a way to show why these practices are reliable". In spite of its popularity, however, IBE is little more than a slogan. "So it is time to flesh out the slogan and to give the model the detailed assessment it deserves. That (...) is the purpose of this book". (shrink)